Formal Opinions
Page 37 of 42
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We are in receipt of your letter dated January 2, 1991, wherein you request our opinion on two issues concerning a gun range located on the grounds of the Enfield Community Correctional Institution. The property in question is owned by the State of Connecticut.
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This letter responds to your request for an opinion dated January 15, 1991. In that request, you asked for a clarification of your authority as a sub registrar of vital statistics to issue a disinterment permit in a case of alleged suspicious death. The request was prompted by a request you received from the parents of a deceased man asking you to issue a disinterment permit for the disinterment of their son for a second autopsy.
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Your department has requested a formal opinion concerning the following questions: “What impact, if any, does the placement of a lis pendens against property (real estate) have upon the bond limit set for a properly licensed and authorized bondsman, when the property in question has been designated as an asset by the bondsman in the calculation of their authorized bond limit?”
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This letter responds to your request for a formal opinion on two questions that have arisen in connection with Substitute Senate Bill No. 963, "An Act Concerning Civil Unions" (File No. 24), passed by the Senate on April 6, 2005, and soon to be considered by the House of Representatives.
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Through your General Counsel, Catherine E. LaMarr, you requested an opinion of this Office on a matter concerning the Second Injury Fund and its assessment audit program. At issue is the meaning of the statutory language "from the date the sum should have been paid" with respect to the statutory interest penalty in Conn. Gen. Stat. §31-354(a). You indicate that the Fund has been applying the statutory interest penalty from the beginning of the audit period on any unpaid amounts resulting from accounting errors, reporting errors, or otherwise.
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You have asked whether the exclusion under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 38a-860(f)(2)(D)(iii) of the Connecticut Life and Health Insurance Guaranty Association Act ("Act") applies to an excess loss health insurance policy issued by Legion Insurance Company ("Legion"), an insurance carrier that is in liquidation, to ProFlow, Inc. ("ProFlow"), a Connecticut corporation, which procured the policy as part of its health benefits plan for its employees.
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This letter is in response to your request for a formal legal opinion as to whether Executive Order No. 7 (the "Order") establishing a State Contracting Standards Board (the "Board") is unconstitutional, in whole or in part, as a violation of the separation of powers clause of article second of the state Constitution.
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By letter of December 19, 1990, CPI and its subsidiaries proposed a payment plan for all unpaid sales and use taxes owed through October 31, 1991. The Department of Revenue Services ("the Department") responded by letter of December 27, 1990 accepting a payment plan on the terms stated in the Department's letter and on the specific condition that current taxes must be filed and paid timely and that the agreement would be subject to review every six months. At some time after the payment plan was initiated, the Department reported CPI's delinquency to the Comptroller pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 12-39g.
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In my opinion, there is no legal distinction between a PSA and a POS, even though the Office of Policy and Management (“OPM”) may choose to establish certain administrative procedures treating these types of agreements differently; they are both valid vehicles for entering into binding State contracts.
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Representative Robert M. Ward, 2005-025, Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut
You have requested a formal legal opinion concerning the protections afforded to members of the General Assembly by Conn. Gen. Stat. § 2-3a, which prohibits discrimination in the workplace against those who hold the office of state senator or representative.
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I write to advise you that you can and should release all information concerning provider rate reimbursement. You have the authority to disclose such provider rate reimbursement information that has been produced to you by Medicaid Managed Care Organizations (“MCOs”). You should reject assertions by the MCOs that the information must be kept confidential under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) and the terms of their contracts with the Department of Social Services (“DSS”).
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Honorable J. Robert Galvin, M.D., M.P.H., 2005-023 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut
Your department has requested our opinion as to the authority of a local health department to conduct warrantless inspections and its authority to issue "hold" orders on food items.
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Honorable J. Robert Galvin, M.D., M.P.H., 2005-022 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut
Your department has requested advice on whether marriages performed on the Mashantucket Pequot Indian Reservation in Ledyard are valid under state law.
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Honorable J. Robert Galvin, 2005-024 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut
This letter is in response to a request from Elizabeth Frugale, Registrar of Vital Records, for a legal opinion as to whether Connecticut courts will recognize out-of-state civil unions, same-sex marriages and same-sex domestic partnerships after Connecticut's Act Concerning Civil Unions, 2005 Conn. Pub. Act No. 05-10 (the "Act" or "P.A. 05-10"), takes effect on October 1, 2005. In particular, Ms. Frugale has asked whether, after October 1st, a couple that has entered into a civil union, same-sex marriage, or domestic partnership out-of-state may legally enter into a civil union in Connecticut with the same partner.1 Because this issue is of statewide interest and importance, we are addressing our response to you in the form of a formal legal opinion.
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As Chairman of the State Marshal Commission you have requested a formal Opinion of the Attorney General as to the following two questions: 1. Are the two ex officio, nonvoting members of the State Marshal Advisory Board, appointed pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 6-38b(a), entitled to attend executive sessions of the State Marshal Commission’s meetings? 2. If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, are they entitled to attend all executive sessions, or are there executive sessions they are not entitled to attend? Specifically, are ex officio members entitled to attend executive sessions regarding personnel and disciplinary matters?